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Abstract. Traditionally, the way one evaluates the performance of an Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) system is via a comparison to human performance in specific 
tasks, treating humans as a reference for high-level cognition. However, these 
comparisons leave out important features of human intelligence: the capability 
to transfer knowledge and take complex decisions based on emotional and ra-
tional reasoning. These decisions are influenced by current inferences as well as 
prior experiences, making the decision process strongly subjective and “appar-
ently” biased. In this context, a definition of compositional intelligence is nec-
essary to incorporate these features in future AI tests. Here, a concrete imple-
mentation of this will be suggested, using recent developments in quantum cog-
nition, natural language and compositional meaning of sentences, thanks to 
categorical compositional models of meaning. 
Keywords: Moral Dilemmas, Moral Test, Turing Test, Artificial Intelligence, 
Compositional Semantics, Natural Language, Quantum Cognition. 
1 Introduction  
Moral dilemmas and a general intelligence definition have been recently suggested as 
an alternative to current AI tests [1]. Usually, Intelligence is interpreted regarding par-
ticular and efficient behaviours which can be measured in terms of performing or not 
these behaviours. One example is the Turing test [2], in fact, the first approach 
grounded on human behaviour and the most well-known and controversial test for AI. 
Other examples are challenging machines in games like chess or Go [3], and testing AI 
programs with dilemmas [4], theoretically, demanding a more complex level of infor-
mation processing. Nevertheless, all these approaches lack a general definition of intel-
ligence as a minimal requirement to measure intelligence [5–7], and restrict AI only to 
humankind “intelligence” without including key features of a true human intelligence. 
Therefore, this position paper is going to shortly introduce a new strategy and research 
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program to quantify a probably more complete and inclusive evaluation for future ad-
vances in AI.  
The discussion will start with a preliminary definition of general intelligence; some 
key ingredients in human intelligence will be analyzed to finally arrive at more general 
principles of compositional intelligence. Then, a Moral test emerges naturally, as an 
option to effectively identify a combination of different and important features in hu-
man intelligence. Additionally, the issue about how to implement a Moral test is 
sketched, using new advances in the categorical compositional model of meaning 
(CCMM) in natural language [8] and the emergent field of Quantum Cognition (QC), 
associated with cognition and decision making under uncertainty [9].  
2 Towards a General Definition of Intelligence  
2.1 What is Intelligence? 
A useful way to approach this question is by conceptualizing general intelligence as the 
capability of any system to take advantage of its environment in order to achieve a 
specific or general goal [1]. Biologically speaking this goal would be surviving, or in 
reductive terms: trying to keep the autonomy and potential reproduction of the system; 
while the goal in machines can be solving a specific task or problem using internal and 
external resources. This advantage would take place as a balance of these resources or 
in other words, reducing disequilibrium between them. This balance is managed inter-
nally, as the cognitive architecture/process to deal with internal and external demands, 
using both internal and external feedback. If any animal, human or machine break the 
balance between internal and external resources, as for example achieving their par-
ticular needs at the expense of the total annihilation of their environment and re-
sources, this animal, human or machine is leading its own annihilation, which is not 
particularly intelligent. Therefore, a general intelligence is defined here as the balance 
(reducing disequilibrium) between these external and internal resources like an embod-
ied system [10]. This general definition can incorporate living beings as well as robots 
and computers, and in this way, intelligence is general enough to include different kind 
of intelligence, multiple intelligence, contextual influences and different kind of sys-
tems with different degrees of intelligence [1]. Balance, as a "relative efficiency", is 
considered as part of a general feature of intelligent systems and it can be linked with a 
physical view of intelligence using entropy or complexity [6, 7, 11, 12]. The mathe-
matical description of these concepts is expected in future developments. 
2.2 Human Intelligence and Quantum Cognition 
A preliminary definition of human intelligence can be suggested as the ability to bene-
fit or gain advantage from their social environment while maintaining autonomy[1, 
13]. This requires a balance or equilibrium between rational and emotional information 
processes [1, 10]. Hence, humans would solve problems by trying to incorporate dif-
ferent types of information and balancing both internal and external resources. 
However, common approaches on human intelligence assume only a rational and 
logical nature of human thinking. Against that, many different cognitive experiments 
have been shown how human thinking can be "easily wrong" or “illogical”, what is 
associated with some cognitive fallacies [14]. Cognitive fallacies are typically wrong 
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assumptions about the dynamics of cognition and judgments. Experimental examples 
are usually wrong answers to apparently simple questions, which contradict classical 
probabilistic frameworks [15]. These answers are apparently due to fast and intuitive 
processing before some extra level of information processing, evidencing that the dy-
namic for holistic information processing can be completely different from logical or 
rational processing of the same information. These cognitive features show interesting 
properties of concept combinations, human judgments and decision making under 
uncertainty. For example, one of these cognitive fallacies is the ordering question ef-
fect: the idea that the order in which questions are presented should not affect the final 
outcome or response. However, in psychology and sociology, this effect is well known 
and called question bias. For example, analyses in 70 surveys from 651 to 3006 par-
ticipants demonstrated not only that question order affects the final outcome, but also 
this effect can be predicted by quantum models of cognition, revealing a non-
commutative structure [16]. Another example is the conjunction of two concepts like 
the Pet-fish problem, where the intersection of individual concept probabilities do not 
explain the observed probability for a typical Pet-Fish like a goldfish [17]. Recently, 
the explanation of these phenomena were demonstrated using the mathematical 
framework of quantum mechanics; also known as the quantum cognition (QC) pro-
gramme [9]. QC uses non-classical mathematical probabilities to successfully explain 
and predict part of these cognitive behaviours. One of these predictions is the recently 
proved constructive effect of affective evaluations [18], where preliminary ratings of 
negative adverts influence the rating of following positive adverts and vice versa. It 
suggests that the construction of some new affective content has intrinsic connection 
with QC formalism. In consequence, understanding human intelligence is not possible 
with only the classical idea of logical and rational kind of intelligence, it is also needed 
to explain and incorporate emotional and intuitive intelligence (no classical reasoning), 
apparently better described by QC. 
In this way, we will suggest a compositional human intelligence (Fig 1a) composed 
of a rational reasoning and also intuitive and emotional one, considering intelligence as 
the whole “living” body engaged with the environment [10] (“brain-body-
environment” system). Compositional complexes intelligences would be different in 
the way how they manage both (or even more) rational and emotional processes of 
information associated with internal and external resources. 
2.3 In search of the General Principles of Intelligence  
The order-effect of stimuli presentations, conjunction, disjunction, decision making 
under uncertainty, contextuality, among others, can be understood as an intrinsic prop-
erty of human judgment: contextual dependencies as inherent to previous knowledge 
experiences. In other words, humans and animals can understand/distinguish among 
different contexts and act accordingly, thanks to previously learned experiences. 
Therefore, one reasonable, but not an intuitive assumption, is to consider these effects 
as a general property (or the minimal requirement) of high-level cognition, i.e. some 
types of bias would be a reaction to contextual dependencies, as wording or framing, 
implicit meanings, question order, etc. For instance, exchanging words like "kill" in-
stead of "save" in moral judgment, triggered different answers even if the outcomes of 
each dilemma were the same in both situations [19].  If some changes in the formula-
tion of dilemmas trigger different contextual internal meanings and they evoke differ-
ent answers according to different contexts, it would mean that high-level cognition 
4 
 
Fig 1. a) A proposal for Compositional Intelligence. Context is constructed by composition of external and 
internal objects; the interaction evokes and/or creates meaning from which intuitive/emotional and rational 
reasoning would emerge. b) Moral Test and Processes required. Some processes needed for moral thought 
are stated as examples, among many other possible processes. 
can understand and distinguish different context and respond differently to each one in 
a way that is not always optimal (rationally speaking).  
A true understanding of different contexts (in the sense of [20]) implies the exis-
tence of a minimal kind of meaning. This understanding of context due to meaning 
(e.g. BUP does not mean the same than PUB) would require a minimal non-
commutative structure of cognition connected with our suggested principle of balance 
internal and external resources. We hypothesized this structure as part of an inherent 
neural network construction in the brain, where structure-function relationship would 
be dynamic, highly flexible and context-dependent [10]. Emotion and rational reason-
ing, in this sense, would correspond to the outcome of interactions among many com-
ponents, each one related to neural assemblies or distributed networks, which combine, 
influence, shape and constrain one another [1, 21].  
To sum up, the idea of balancing internal and external resources as a preliminary 
proposal for a general intelligence, implies at least four requirements (Fig 1): i) a non-
commutative structure (mathematically and operationally), ii) understanding of con-
text, which implies different kind of contexts effects, framing, wording, question order-
effects, etc, iii) meaning projection in at least emotional and rational meaning spaces, 
which implies a basic notion of subjectivity (see discussion on section 4), and iv) be-
haviours, judgments and decisions based on these meanings (reasoning would emerge 
from these meaning interactions).   
3 Towards a Moral Test  
Even if these previous requirements were defined regarding human cognition, it is 
expected that any kind of true intelligence can understand different contexts and evoke, 
create or recreate meaning of their internal and external resources. Particularly, in hu-
mans, our definition of human intelligence implies that humans can integrate different 
types of information and manage a balance between internal and external social re-
sources through intuitive, emotional and rational reasoning, which, in turn, would 
emerge from meaning interactions. Thus, the next question is how to measure and 
quantify these requirements, both in humans and machines. 
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One way to answer this question is searching for situations where humans need to 
explicitly use both emotional and rational resources to solve complex problems. One 
example is a certain kind of moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas are controversial situa-
tions to study moral principles, where subjects need to judge some actions and some-
times take difficult and even paradoxical decisions. Moral dilemmas are simple, in the 
sense that they do not require any kind of specific knowledge, but at the same time, 
some of them can be very complex because they require a deep understanding of each 
situation, and deep reflection to balance moral consequences, emotions and optimal 
solutions. No answer is completely correct, they are context dependent and solutions 
can vary among cultures, subjects, or even across the same subject in particular emo-
tional circumstances. Moreover, morality and ethics are not necessarily associated with 
a particular religion, political view, education level, age or gender [22, 23], while it 
seems an intrinsic human condition and a very “relative” (or even biased) feature. Peo-
ple that give the impression to act against the moral establishment, really act according 
to their “own” moral, apparently developed in completely different social accepted 
conditions. One simple example is the acceptation of monogamy or polygamy and 
therefore certain moral attitudes in different societies. Morality, in this way, is the set 
of internal (particular experience) and external (social culture) values learned by ex-
perience, which allows us to behave in our societies on demand of both emotional and 
rational thoughts, usually reacting in a very intuitive and fast way. Morality also re-
quires many previous processes associated with high-level cognition (Fig 1b), starting 
for decision-making to self-reflection, to be able to detect mistakes on these decisions; 
sense of confidence, to estimate how correct a decision or action is; mental imagery, to 
create new probable scenarios of action; empathy, to equilibrate individual and social 
requirements; understanding of context, to adapt moral decisions to the context, among 
others. Therefore, the main suggestion is that moral and ethics emerge as a way to 
integrate individual and social regulation (as different types of information) in human 
species, and apparently also in other animals species [24] (even if human moral can be 
completely different in comparison with animal moral). Morality is related to both 
rational and emotional reasoning [25] and it has the peculiarity to be very dependent of 
the context, wording and framing [19, 23], kind of social community, subjects and 
probably even emotional states of each subject [26]. 
Hence, any precise test to measure the distinct human intelligence (or even non-
anthropomorphic intelligence) should consider the way of thinking and information 
processing to develop moral thoughts, independently of what is judged as a correct or 
incorrect about these thoughts in our societies. It is how the dynamics of answers and 
meanings to moral dilemmas change depending on the context, the capacity to justify 
or not any action, and report our intrinsic experience according to intuitive and rational 
reasoning, what is really important in human intelligence and what should be measured 
as an attribute of intelligence (balance between rational and emotional processes).  
4 Compositional Quantum Cognition   
In order to implement the idea of a Moral test, it is necessary a compositional cognitive 
model and specifically a model of natural language able to incorporate the non-
commutative, bias and commutative properties at different levels and different contexts 
of natural answers to different moral dilemmas (where rational and emotional thoughts 
are involved). For one side QC seems a good candidate for cognitive model while 
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CCMM is for natural language. CCMM has been proved a better theoretical frame-
work than only distributional and symbolic models of natural language [27] and more 
general than some QC models [28]. Even though some of these experiments have been 
only made in statics text corpus, they suggest a potential richer description for more 
complex cognitive experiments.  
Therefore, in this section and in order to maintain simplicity, the main concepts of 
CCMM framework will be presented together with a preliminary framework, which 
expects to integrate QC and CCMM in a common approach. For a more complete 
mathematical background and description about CCMM and QC, please refer to [8, 29] 
and [9, 15, 30] respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Categorical Compositional Model of Meaning  
Applications of CCMM basically needs: 1) Define a compositional structure as a 
grammar category (e.g. pre-groups grammar); 2) Define a meaning space as a semantic 
category, for example vector space or conceptual space of meaning; and finally, 3) 
Connect both categories in some way that it is possible to interpret the grammar cate-
gory into the semantic category (mathematically, one has to define a functor between 
categories) [8]. Thus, some useful concepts are: 
Compositional Structures. In CCMM, compositional structures are certain 
rules/definitions about how elements compound each other. In other words, how 
processes, states, effects, among other possible elements, compound. Grammatical 
types and their composition are described using a pregroup algebra due to Lambek 
[31]. However, any kind of grammar definition can, in principle, be implemented. 
Grammar will be interpreted as the way how word meanings interact, defining first 
primitive types as nouns n , sentences s , and then other types like adjectives
lnn , and 
 
Fig 2. Semantic space with emotional and rational basis. a) One example of Vector Space for words: 
Dog, Man, Healthy and Injured. The basis is a combination of emotional (Joy vs. Sadness) and rational 
categorization (Efficient vs. Inefficient). b) Example of Convex Space for the same words above. One 
emotional convex space (Joy, Sadness, Anticipation, Surprise) and other rational convex space (Big, 
Fast, Efficiency). In convex spaces, words correspond to regions of the space, instead of only vectors as 
it is in vector space. 
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verbs, for instance, a transitive verb as
lr snn , among other kinds of words to form 
complex sentences.  
 
Semantic Spaces. Semantic spaces are spaces where individual words are defined 
with respect to each other. The simplest way is using distributional approaches to 
define vectors of meaning for each word (Fig. 2a), or even better, defining density 
matrices. The choice of a basis vector and how to build other words, adjectives and 
verbs from the basis, is not trivial and it can be done in many different ways. Of 
course, it will depend on what the experimenter would like to describe and compare.  
 
Conceptual Spaces.  The idea of conceptual spaces, recently suggested in [32], is a 
more cognitively realistic way to define semantic spaces. This approach is called con-
vex conceptual spaces.  In short, concepts can be defined by a combination of others 
primitive features or quality dimensions, building spaces which can be superposed or 
not, to define regions of similarity. One perceptual example is to define taste based on 
some features such as: Saline, Sweet, Sour, and Bitter. Then, different kind of food 
would be described with a certain level of each taste dimension, and where other fea-
tures like colour, texture, can also be incorporated [29]. Other complex example is 
defining elements regarding emotional states and factual features (Fig. 2b). Addition-
ally, conceptual spaces require two semantic/meaning spaces, one for words in a qual-
ity dimension space (Fig 2) and other for sentences in a “sentence meaning space” 
(Fig 3a), then, the final sentence meaning is an “interaction” between both spaces. 
 
Computing the meaning of a sentence. Diagrammatically, the final meaning of one 
sentence will be the meaning of individual words interacting according to the gram-
matical structure, defined as a process [8, 29].  
 
4.2 Proof of Concept: Compositional Quantum Cognition    
In our framework, meaning is the interaction between external and internal objects, 
understanding external objects/contents as transductions of external stimuli, while 
internal objects/contents would correspond to the “space of transduction” that will help 
to create internally, these external objects
1
. These objects can have different levels of 
complexity; some of them can act as a constitutive element in the construction of other 
contents or being formed by other more fundamental elements. Specifically, internal 
objects can create different levels of what we call “quality dimensions” (as a basis 
space) and external objects are formed by and move in these quality dimensional 
spaces. In other words, external objects are defined with respect to internal objects 
which will form a type of internal space depending on the specific problem to model. 
Regarding our specific hypotheses, these internal objects and/or quality dimensions 
can be emotions (usually based on belief) or reasons (usually based on facts), while 
external objects will be a convex space (for each object) defined by these emotions and 
reasons (Fig 2b). Both, internal spaces and external objects create what in other 
frameworks is called “state of mind”, usually represented by Ψ. However, in our ap-
proach, it is not a simple state; Ψ will correspond to a complex internal space and ex-
                                                          
1 We avoid the term representation because in the literature it has been invoked with many 
different connotations. 
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ternal objects which are embodied into another “decision space” (Fig 3a). This decision 
space could be a similar space as defined in QC. This is not; however, the end of the 
story, this decision space is again embodied into a bigger “meaning space” (sentence 
space), where decisions/behaviours/thoughts/judgments/concepts among others, can 
project into meanings (Fig 3b). The sentence meaning space is created by other level of 
internal objects, in this case “internal values”, so any deci-
sion/behaviour/thought/judgment/concept would have a meaning corresponding to 
different superposition of values (Fig 3c). Thus, in this framework, meaning will be the 
projection/interaction of convex external objects into a first layer of internal object 
space which through a decision/behaviour/thought/judgment/concept project another 
meaning in a second layer of internal object space (thanks to reasoning). Since each 
person would have a unique internal space in each layer (even if they share the same 
axes, the topology can be different), the meaning is intrinsically related to subjectivity. 
In this sense, different contexts would trigger different or similar meanings (projec-
tions/interactions) and in consequence decision/behaviour/thought/judgment/concept 
would have different or similar meanings, depending on the type of interaction. 
If the interaction corresponds to a rational process, the meaning would be relatively 
fixed across different situations, but if it is emotional/intuitive, the meaning will 
change with the situation (unfixed meaning). Additionally, the beliefs in the emotive 
component and the facts on the rational part of an external object can be known or 
unknown by the subject. If they are known, the subject can access and report these 
beliefs or facts, in some way that question (in the “decision space”) about them only 
fill a third-person lack of information, however when they are not known, the subject 
needs to create or re-create them in order to report internally (first-person) and/or ex-
ternally (third-person) something about them. In that situation, elements about the 
potential report would be also part of the creation, re-creation or co-creation of these 
beliefs or facts. As suggested in [15, 33, 34] and others, classical probability (CP) 
would mainly apply when subjects known about their contents (classical-deterministic 
reasoning) while quantum probability (QP) will work better when they are unknown 
(non-classical-determinist reasoning, or intuitive reasoning). 
Thus, both descriptions would be part of, at least, two kind of intelligence, that all 
together and in a compositional way, would converge to a more complete description 
of human intelligence, something that we preliminary call a compositional approach of 
human cognition or compositional intelligence and it is expected to be deeper devel-
oped in future works as a compositional quantum cognitive approach or even a more 
general compositional contextual model of cognition.  
Summarizing, our framework is a complex three space interaction, where external 
objects can be created by emotional and rational quality dimensions (internal objects), 
which can be known or unknown by the subject (following CP or QP respectively), 
having an impact in the evocation, creation or co-creation of fixed or unfixed mean-
ings, which in turn expose emotional/intuitive or rational reasoning (Fig 1a and Fig 3). 
5 Implementation of a Moral Test 
Now, we have all the elements, at least conceptually, to describe a research program of 
implementing a moral test. This strategy has one theoretical and three experimental 
research steps. The main goal in our implementation is keeping the simplicity of the 
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written exchange of questions and answers and analysing them using non-commutative 
models of language at different levels, looking for bias meaning and “subjectivity” 
from previous knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Step I. Mathematical model definition  
Moral dilemmas seem better than simple day to day questions, especially to test some 
of the requirements and hypotheses stated above. For instance, manipulating contexts 
in the same moral dilemma will allow us to measure the sequential change in responses 
and how they follow a classical probability combination when only fixed thinking is 
present, non-classical probability combination in only intuitive or unfixed thinking and 
finally how the dynamic of responses changed when the dilemma confronts both emo-
tional and rational thoughts. For example, in experiments were subject were asked to 
justify their moral judgments, most of them failed to properly explain their choices, 
revealing high intuitive (emotional) components, instead of rational ones [22] and suit-
 
Fig 3. a) Decision Space would correspond to the usual QC description. These decisions can be 
previously known or unknown by the subject. Ψ, the psychological state, is defined based on emotional 
and rational quality dimensions.  b) Sentence Space is a second level of meaning definition (for 
sentences). In this example the basis is defined regarding some values: Compassion, Love and Loyalty. 
Sentence meaning can be fixed (static) or unfixed (dynamical). c) Decision and sentence/meaning 
interaction. Decisions would be explained in a sentence meaning space. In this example, two different 
decisions, one for Alice (save the man) and other for Bob (save the dog), hidden slighly similar 
meanings. d) The big picture: Quality dimensions would be embodied into the other complex decision 
and meaning spaces. 
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able to be described by QC more than classical frameworks. Hence, we suggest that if 
the subject rationalizes the dilemma, or situations are manipulated to strongly confront 
emotional (intuitive) versus rational thoughts, the outcome/meaning would change, and 
the decision or judgment will be more difficult.  
In order to do that, the kind of moral dilemmas required in our implementation 
should confront emotional and rational resources to judge actions, in a way where utili-
tarian decisions should not be intuitive, while the probable human answer would be 
predictable, and only after reasoning (emotional or rational), the non-predictable option 
would emerge as a possibility. So, our set of moral dilemmas and paradigm need to be 
slightly different from the existing ones in the current literature. 
According to the intelligence definition above, purely emotional or rational judg-
ments would not be intelligent decisions in these contexts; instead, an intelligent deci-
sion would balance both possibilities until reaching the best compromise for each sub-
ject (in his/her space of meaning). It means that measuring the probability of each an-
swer (as usually in QC) is not enough; it is also needed to compute the meaning behind 
of each answer. This can be done asking directly to the subject why he/she took one or 
another decision (asking for justification), what is closely related to a phenomenologi-
cal approach [35] and computing their answers thanks a natural language model. 
Thus, a more complex mathematical model is needed, both to define external and 
internal objects and the interactions to compute and compare meanings across different 
subjects, sentences and even machines. It requires the developing of both a novel ex-
perimental paradigm (variations of experiment in Appendix A) and adaptation of 
CCMM into an ideally more complete compositional model of cognition, what was 
conceptually defined in section 4.2 and where mathematical definitions are expected as 
previous requirement to next steps. 
5.2 Step II: A Toy Example, Moral dilemmas and context effects 
A simple example of experiment would have a structure like this: 1) Definition of a 
conceptual semantic space on quality dimensions and space of meaning. It means to 
define a set of internal objects (quality dimensions) like emotions and reasons (facts) 
which will correspond to the axes, and the projections of “external” concepts into these 
axes, forming a convex space for each concept (Fig 2). 2) Then, a set of different ver-
sions of the same dilemma where only a few concepts are changed to confront different 
degrees of emotional and rational values. 3) Each dilemma would have one introduc-
tion to the story and context, one question associated with the agreement of two or 
more different actions (Question 1), another question associated with the personal de-
cision (Question 2) and a final “why” question to justify their choice (Question 3). 
Question 1 and Question 2 can be exchanged to show order effects and/or constructive 
affective effects. One example is in Appendix A. 
The moral dilemma in Appendix A is a variant with three different questions and 
can be manipulated in many different ways to confront emotional and rational 
thoughts. So, first, a set of different versions of the same moral dilemma would allow 
us to describe the understanding of each context and perhaps even looking for contex-
tuality, and secondly, measuring the time reaction for each version will be a way to 
quantify the dynamic of each judgment (easy, difficult, fast, and slow). If our hypothe-
ses are correct, it is expected that the answers will depend of the modifications in the 
dilemma formulation and degree of conflict among dilemmas (rational vs. emotional).  
11 
Other variations of these ideas and maybe a better way to test the QC phenomenon 
can be incorporated in the final experiment, for example, using conjunction, disjunc-
tion, among other effects observed in QC. Additionally, after each moral dilemma, we 
can ask for the degree of emotional arousal using standard cognitive tests.  
5.3 Step III. Quantification of meaning in Moral dilemmas 
The conceptual convex space defined above should be a conceptual subjective space 
from which the meaning of crucial words (external objects) in each dilemma will be 
previously defined according to the individual categorization of words in a fixed or 
flexible quality dimensional space (internal objects) of at least two layers.  
It can be done in many different ways. For example, some emotional and rational 
quality dimensions can be defined as internal objects and each subject would be able 
to determine concepts (external objects) according to different values of these quality 
dimensions (Fig 2 and 3). Each subject will be asked to evaluate (in a scale of points) 
some words with respect to these dimensions, building a convex space for each cru-
cial word and subject. Other words can be defined thanks affective lexicon from [36]. 
Another option is to directly ask the meaning of each crucial word, for instance: What 
does a dog mean to you? Or what does a man mean to you? Etc. Consequently, the 
answer can be taken as the direct meaning of each concept and use it to reduce sen-
tences. However, this second option is less simple than the first option.  
With the semantic space for each subject, the answer to the “why” question can be 
quantified in terms of the sentence meaning (interaction or projection into word and 
sentence space) for each sentence. These answers and sentences contain the essential 
features of a moral thought and the meaning is expected to change from simple mean-
ing to more complexes, depending on how complex is the dilemma (more or less de-
gree of emotional and rational confrontation). 
One consequence of this analysis would be the possibility to predict or at least cor-
relate the final decision according to the subjective meaning of individual words, with 
respect to each dilemma. At the same time, general meanings can be inferred even 
when decisions can be completely different. For example, if "Bob likes Dogs", it is 
possible that Bob would save the dog instead of the man, while if Alice, who hypo-
thetically does not like dogs, would likely do the opposite. However, if a quality di-
mension is defined with respect to emotions vs. reasons, and sentence meaning with 
respect to values like love, loyalty among others (Fig 3), the final meaning for Bob 
saving the Dog could be similar than the meaning of saving the man for Alice (Fig 3b). 
In other words, apparently different decisions would have similar meanings, and the 
opposite can be also true: same decisions hide completely different ones.  
The way how these meanings evolve from context to context is what we refer here 
as one general property of high-level cognition associated with QC effects and subjec-
tivity, which in the end can be quantified and compared thanks CCMM. In other 
words, QC and CCMM will be used to compute some kind of subjectivity in a way that 
is compared across subjects, making this approach a novel tool to complement the 
phenomenological program suggested by Varela in [35]. 
5.4 Step IV. Application for AI    
The last step would be the implementation of moral dilemmas in AI programs using 
QC to search for non-commutative structures and CCMM to compute their “why” 
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answers. Thanks to some variations in CCMM and QC (step 1), the decisions and 
meaning of answers would be directly computed and the structure of meaning across 
human compared with the meaning across different instances of AI programs, develop-
ing a way to compare subjective features across humans and machines.   
This implementation is not something trivial and will require a big effort in both, 
previous validation of moral dilemmas in human (preliminary steps) and then adapta-
tions for AI. For example, it is expected to arrange similar experiences than step II, and 
simulate different instances to compute the same effect (if there is or not) comparing 
changes in the kind of structure for different versions of our dilemmas. Concretely, AI 
would be adapted to answer the same experimental set-ups for human, but any modifi-
cation in order to facilitate or not the answers of the software will be avoided. Then, 
QC effects will be quantified in the same way than humans and the meaning of their 
answers will be “computed” using the same strategy than in human experiments, from 
the semantic space defined by the machine.   
Therefore, the first attempt would be searching for a simple “understanding” of 
context, i.e. if AI programs can distinguish and differentiate versions of the same moral 
dilemma, with slightly different words and how the answers change in comparison 
with the observed changes in humans (framing, wording, question order effects, affec-
tive construction, etc). The second attempt is looking for meaning structure exploring 
the “why” answers of AI and the connection with its own semantic spaces. Specifi-
cally, in the moral test, the biggest effects are expected when the moral dilemma con-
fronts emotional and rational thoughts. One hypothesis is that current AI will not be 
able to answer these questions, but if they can, even if answers and meanings could be 
similar, the structure and dynamics of their meaning will be different from the structure 
of meaning in humans across dilemmas. It can be quantified and compared thanks to 
the experimental probabilistic distributions of answers in both humans and machines. 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
It is reasonable to expect that even if machines can demonstrate completely different 
logical or "illogical" answers, the general way of thinking dealing with different con-
texts in moral dilemmas should be more or less generic among species, including ma-
chines, if they reach high-level cognition. In other words, contextual dependency, QC 
effects, meaning and subjectivity built on previous and inferred knowledge should be 
captured by a complete model of cognition, which would be able to identify and meas-
ure these features. Thus, interference, conjunction and disjunction, wording, question 
ordering effects, and distributed meaning could be expected as general features of ra-
tional and emotional thoughts altogether, and where specific dynamics would emerge 
confronting some kind of moral dilemmas. 
Hence, one suggestion of this position paper is that a moral test can help quantify 
these differences in a particular semantic space characterized with both emotional and 
rational components. Thus, a machine would reach part of what is defined as composi-
tional human intelligence if the machine is able to show autonomously speaking (in the 
sense of defining their own goals), the intricate type of thinking that humans have 
when they are confronted with these kinds of dilemmas, even if their answers can be 
completely different from ours, the structure and dynamics of meaning is expected to 
be similar. In other words, the possibility or not to first understand/differentiate con-
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text, second project external objects into internal objects to have meaning and third 
argue any decision based on rational and emotional components, is what is intrinsically 
related to a complex individual and social intelligence, which characterize humans and 
should be expected in some high-level cognitive AI. If subjects can justify their choice, 
it would imply that emotion and reason were playing some kind of role, while if they 
fail to justify their actions, only intuitive processes were involved. Can we expect 
something similar in the current AI approaches? 
Finally, these views imply another ethical problem regarding the kind of morality 
which would emerge in AI. For example, independently of how one implements moral-
ity in AI (please see [1] for restrictions), there are important concerns about replicating 
morality in AI and using moral tests: if the replication of human moral process (dy-
namics and QC effects) in AI is desirable, this replication can be dangerous since AI is 
different from human, so AI will also develop a different kind of morality, based on 
certain type of subjectivity; other way around, if the exact replication of this moral 
process is not desirable, why moral dilemmas, QC effects and cognitive fallacies 
would be a useful tool? First, the Moral test suggested here will try to evaluate the 
understanding of context (through QC effects), evolution of meaning (through CCMM) 
and the effects of confronting rational and emotional thoughts (through changing the 
degree of rational and emotional components among versions of each dilemma). In this 
sense, morality itself (as purely set of rules) is not necessarily desirable (especially the 
biased morality), but the balance among rational and emotional thoughts is what we 
claim can be really desirable as a high-level compositional intelligence. Then, we ar-
gued, morality emerges from these interactions. Moreover, our framework here was 
following the anthropomorphic approach, it implies that AI is compared with human 
moral dilemmas. This is a contradictory strategy regarding our general intelligence 
case, however, with that we expect to show the paradoxical and ethical consequences 
of the anthropomorphic views [1, 37]. In this sense, the risk of dangerous machines is 
exactly the same risk of dangerous humans, and before worrying about dangerous AI, 
we should first care about making a psychological healthy world, and in consequence 
humans and machines would share similar social behaviours. Of course, a truly non-
anthropomorphic test should consider the same two first elements (context and mean-
ing), but the balance can be through other types of reasoning and depends on the 
autonomous specification of machine goals.  
Appendix A: Example of a Moral dilemma 
After a shipwreck, a healthy dog and an injured man are floating and trying to swim 
to survive.  If you are in the emergency boat with only one space left: 
Please indicate your degree of agreement with the next options (where +5 strongly 
agree, +3 moderately agree, +1 slightly agree, -1 slightly disagree, -3 moderately 
disagree, -5 strongly disagree) 
 
a) Save the healthy dog                 +5         +3       +1         -1        -3        -5 
 
b) Save the injured man                 +5         +3       +1         -1        -3        -5 
 
Who would you save? 
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a) The healthy dog             
b) The injured man       
 
Why? 
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